G20: A Room for Global Club Governance: Towards a Global Innovation System? by Erdil, Erkan
METU
TEKPOL
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES RESEARCH CENTER 




G20: A Room for Global Club Governance: 
Towards a Global  Innovation System?
   
Erkan ERDİL, Dirk MEISSNER and Özgür Kadir ÖZER
TEKPOL | Science and Technology Policies Research Center







In	 the	 new	digital	 transformation	 age,	 innovation	processes	 is	 genuinely	 becoming	more	 complex.	
Most	of	the	hi-tech	or	medium-tech	products	and	services	are	produced	at	different	 locations	with	
rising	 collaborations.	 The	 radical	 changes	 observed	 in	 the	 last	 decades	 make	 the	 innovation	
processes	and	innovation	system	concepts	as	being	a	transnational	issue	rather	than	limited	with	the	
national	 borders.	 This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 classical	 concepts	 of	 national,	 regional,	 sectoral	 or	
technological	 innovation	 systems	 are	 useless	 but	 it	 calls	 for	 an	 action	 for	 the	 entangled	 relations	
among	 these	 systems	 through	 club	 governance.	 G20	 is	 observed	 as	 a	 significant	 economic	
playground	with	its	connections	through	east	to	west	and	north	to	south	of	the	globe.	This	stylized	
fact	underlines	 the	 changing	geography	of	 innovation.	As	an	early	 attempt	 to	 conceptualize	global	
innovation	 systems	 (GIS),	 Dahlman	 (2012)5	 defines	 8	 dimensions	 where	 global	 networks	 cutting	
across	 national	 innovation	 system	 (NIS),	 namely	 trade	 in	 goods	 and	 services;	 activities	 of	





Global	 Innovation	 System	 (GIS)	 as	 the	 new	 phase	 of	 capitalism	 where	 its	 certain	 features	 are	
reflected	in	already	existing	NIS	though	it	surpasses	the	roots	of	NIS.	GIS	functions	as	integrating	tool	
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It’s	 postulated	 by	 the	 authors	 that	 such	 an	 approach	 is	 instrumental	 for	 policy	 intervention	 to	





and	 then	 use	 secondary	 data	 to	 determine	 the	 existing	 situation	 towards	 modelling	 the	 global	
innovation	system.		We	define	GIS	as	a	globally	governed	network	of	collaborative	relations	between	
different	actors,	including	firms	engaged	in	updating	knowledge	base	towards	any	type	of	innovation.	
Currently	 global	 governance	 is	mainly	 affiliated	 with	 working	 parties	 and	 committees	 attached	 to	
international	 organizations	 and	 serve	 as	 platforms	 for	 information	 and	 idea	 exchange	 between	
	 3	
countries.	Such	working	groups	frequently	involve	numerous	national	experts	representing	countries	
and	 operated	 by	 secretariats.	 The	 empirical	 part	 of	 the	 paper	 focuses	 on	 STI	 competence	 of	 G20	
countries	and	their	interlinkages	with	the	other	clubs	through	knowledge	generation	and	spillovers.	






The	 literature	 on	 welfare	 in	 evolutionary	 economics	 mainly	 focuses	 on	 fostering	 education	 and	
innovation	as	 a	 central	means	of	welfare	and	growth.	 In	 this	perspective,	 it	 is	 considered	 that	 the	
transformation	 and	 development	 of	 societies	 is	 strongly	 depended	 upon	 the	 technological	
development	 or	 the	 emergence	 of	 technological	 routines.	 This	 transformation	 requires	 knowledge	
generation.	However,	one	may	argue	 that	 this	 strong	emphasis	on	 innovation	and	 technology	only	
represents	 a	 fragment	 of	 an	 evolutionary	 welfare	 economics.	 Nevertheless,	 some	 additional	





development	 has	 a	 bidirectional	 causality	 and	 thus,	 a	 concurrent	 feedback.	 Moreover,	 current	
approaches	suffer	from	a	vague	or	limited	applied	research	to	determine	the	real	strength	of	welfare	
economies.	Of	course,	we	are	challenging	a	neoclassical	welfare	or	purely	Keynesian	welfare;	but	the	
locus	of	our	 research	 is	 implicitly	 founded	on	 the	 theory	of	 evolutionary	welfare	 including	 gradual	
improvements	of	all	capital	infrastructures	including	actors,	institutions,	human	capital	and	relational	
capital	 through	 collaboration	 networks	 in	 the	 context	 of	 economics	 of	 technology.	 From	 this	
perspective;	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 features	 for	 welfare	 economics;	 we	 propose	 that	 the	
knowledge	generation	through	 linkages,	collaboration,	etc.	 should	 further	be	analysed.	 In	addition,	
we	further	propose	that	the	specific	analysis	for	knowledge	generation	should	be	accomplished	for	
emerging	 economies	 that	 encounter	 infrastructural	 problems	 or	 problems	 at	 various	 levels	 of	









economic	 aspects	 (productivity	 and	 income)	 and	 technology	 (as	 an	 intermediary)	 with	 a	 leader	
country	in	order	to	reduce	the	overall	differences	as	a	whole.	The	issue	of	catch-up	has	been	crucial	
for	the	academic	research	as	growth	proceeds	such	convergence	on	the	long	run	(Solow,	1974).		Of	
course,	 it	 is	 highly	 metaphorical	 that	 all	 developing	 countries	 tend	 to	 converge	 and	 succeed	 in	
catching-up	while	others	fall	behind	(Abramovitz,	1986).	
On	 the	 following,	 engaging	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 actors	 has	 long	 been	 fundamental	 to	 economic	
development,	the	significance	of	and	the	need	for	a	new	approach	has	emerged:	the	Quadruple	Helix	
model	by	proposing	to	add	a	fourth	group	(civil	society	as	innovation	users)	to	a	classical	Triple	Helix	
model.	 This	 model	 is	 potentially	 “open”	 to	 support	 economic	 development	 since	 these	 different	
actors	have	skills	and	knowledge.	Furthermore,	this	model	develops	open	innovation’s	dialect	with	a	
new	development	approach	in	that	of	 innovations	are	pertinent	for	users	who	drive	the	innovation	
processes.	 In	 line	 with	 this	 perspective,	 new	 innovative	 products,	 services	 and	 solutions	 are	














also	be	characterized	by	convergence	 in	productivity	and	 income	and	GDP	per	capita	compared	 to	
the	 industrialized	economies	 (as	 the	most	 striking	 evidence	on	 the	 great	 variation	of	 performance	




be	ranked	12th	 in	year	2041	(see	Table	1	and	Figure	4).	 	On	the	contrary,	Brazil	sustains	 its	relative	
economic	and	geographic	advantages	by	sustaining	a	bigger	GDP	growth	as	ranked	7th	to	4th	in	2041.	
Nevertheless,	 current	 scientific	 evidence	 on	 economic	 growth	 (see	 IMF	 World	 Economic	 Outlook	
2015)	and	innovativeness	index	(see	The	Global	Innovation	Index	2016	in	Cornell	University,	INSEAD,	
and	WIPO	2016)	show	us	that	Turkish	rankings	are	preferably	stable	(ranked	42nd	in	2016;	was	58th	in	
2015).	But,	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	Turkey	 is	 showing	 relatively	 low	performance	when	compared	 to	
other	developing	countries	having	higher	 income	 like	Brazil	 (ranked	70th	 in	2016;	was	69th	 in	2015;	
and	Chile	 (ranked	 44th	 in	 2016;	was	 42nd	 in	 2015).	 Further	 argument	might	 be	 extended	 in	 such	 a	







Rank	 Country	(FY2011)	 Rank	 Country	(FY2041)	
1	 US	 1	 China	
2	 China	 2	 US	
3	 India	 3	 India	
4	 Japan	 4	 Brazil	
5	 Germany	 5	 Japan	
6	 Russia	 6	 Russia	
7	 Brazil	 7	 Mexico	
8	 UK	 8	 Indonesia	
9	 France	 9	 Germany	
10	 Italy	 10	 UK	
11	 Mexico	 11	 France	
12	 Korea	 12	 Turkey	
13	 Spain	 13	 Nigeria	
14	 Canada	 14	 Korea	
15	 Indonesia	 15	 Italy	
16	 Turkey	 16	 Canada	
17	 Australia	 17	 Vietnam	
18	 Argentina	 18	 Saudi	Arabia	
19	 Saudi	Arabia	 19	 Spain	











diversity	 of	 growth	 processes	 among	 developing	 countries	 reflects	 differences	 in	 institutional	





































G20	 economies,	 only	 India’s	 expected	 years	 of	 schooling	 is	 lower	 than	 the	world	 average	 of	 12.3	
years.	On	the	other	hand,	the	mean	years	of	schooling	is	lower	than	the	world	average	(8.3	years)	in	





















2	 Australia	 24,598	 0.939	 82.5	 20.4	 13.2	 42,822	
4	 Germany	 82,695	 0.926	 81.1	 17.1	 13.2	 45,000	
10	 Canada	 36,708	 0.920	 82.2	 16.3	 13.1	 53,245	
10	 US	 325,719	 0.920	 79.2	 16.5	 13.2	 42,582	
16	 UK	 66,022	 0.909	 80.8	 16.3	 13.3	 37,931	
17	 Japan	 126,785	 0.903	 83.7	 15.3	 12.5	 37,268	
18	 Korea	 51,466	 0.901	 82.1	 16.6	 12.2	 34,541	
21	 France	 67,118	 0.897	 82.4	 16.3	 11.6	 38,085	
26	 Italy	 60,551	 0.887	 83.3	 16.3	 10.9	 33,573	
38	 Saudi	Arabia	 32,938	 0.847	 74.4	 16.1	 9.6	 51,320	
45	 Argentina	 44,271	 0.827	 76.5	 17.3	 9.9	 20,945	
49	 Russia	 144,495	 0.804	 70.3	 15.0	 12.0	 23,286	
71	 Turkey	 80,745	 0.767	 75.5	 14.6	 7.9	 18,705	
77	 Mexico	 129,163	 0.762	 77.0	 13.3	 8.6	 16,383	
79	 Brazil	 209,288	 0.754	 74.7	 15.2	 7.8	 14,145	
90	 China	 1,386,395	 0.738	 76.0	 13.5	 7.6	 13,345	
113	 Indonesia	 263,991	 0.689	 69.1	 12.9	 7.9	 10,053	
119	 South	Africa	 56,717	 0.666	 57.7	 13.0	 10.3	 12,087	
131	 India	 1,339,180	 0.624	 68.3	 11.7	 6.3	 5,663	
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it	 is	 lower	 than	 50%	 only	 in	 India	 and	 Indonesia	 amongst	 them.	 Industry	 (including	 construction)	
follow	services	 in	most	of	 those	economies.	 Industry	constitutes	18	 to	40%	of	 the	GDP	across	G20	
countries.	As	evident	from	Figure	10,	the	share	of	industry	in	GDP	is	higher	than	30%	of	the	GDP	only	
in	 China	 (40.4%),	 Indonesia	 (39.3%),	 Korea	 (35.8%),	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia	 (44.9%).	 The	 share	 of	
















































G20	economies	 lead	 the	 international	 trade	 in	every	aspect	 (Figures	12	and	13).	 In	2016,	76.2%	of	
total	exports	of	and	76.08%	of	total	 imports	of	goods	and	services	was	realized	by	G20	economies.	
While	the	shares	of	G7,	OECD,	and	EU	economies	in	total	exports	and	imports	have	declined,	G20’s	
shares	 have	 remained	 stable,	 mostly	 due	 to	 the	 increased	 participation	 of	 China	 into	 the	
international	 trade	 (between	 2000	 and	 2016,	 China’s	 share	 in	 total	 exports	 of	 goods	 and	 services	
increased	from	3.19%	to	10.53%).	Within	G20,	EU	countries	go	ahead	of	other	economies	in	terms	of	












































group	 imports	 of	 products	 (US$	 6.1	 trillion,	 current	 prices)	 corresponded	 to	 62.8%	 of	 their	 total	
imports	 of	 products	 (US$	 9.7	 trillion,	 current	 prices)	 in	 2016.	 58.8%	 of	 total	 manufactured	 goods	
(about	US$	4.25	trillion,	current	prices)	was	exported	to	other	G20	economies	in	the	same	year.	The	
share	 of	 intra-group	 exports	 in	 total	 labor-intensive	 and	 resource-intensive	 manufactures8	 was	
55.7%,	in	total	low-skill	and	technology-intensive	manufactures9	was	49.6%,	in	total	medium-skill	and	
technology-intensive	 manufactures10	 was	 64.5%,	 and	 in	 total	 high-skill	 and	 technology-intensive	
																																																						
8	 Leather,	wood	manufacture,	paper	and	paperboard,	 textile	yarn,	 fabrics,	woven,	 floor	coverings,	 lime,	cement,	mineral	
manufactures,	glass,	pottery,	furniture	&	parts,	clothing,	clothing	accessories,	footwear	etc.	(UNCTAD)	
9	Pig	iron	&	spiegeleisen,	sponge	iron;	ingots,	primary	forms,	of	iron	or	steel;	rails	&	railway	track	construction	mat.,	iron,	
steel;	 wire	 of	 iron	 or	 steel;	 tubes,	 pipes	 &	 hollow	 profiles,	 fittings,	 iron,	 steel;	 wire	 products	 (excluding	 electrical)	 and	
fencing	 grills;	 nails,	 screws,	 nuts,	 bolts,	 rivets	 &	 the	 like,	 of	 metal;	 tools	 for	 use	 in	 the	 hand	 or	 in	 machine;	 cutlery;	
household	 equipment	 of	 base	 metal;	 motorcycles	 &	 cycles;	 trailers	 &	 semi-trailers;	 railway	 vehicles	 &	 associated	
equipment;	ships,	boats	&	floating	structures;	office	&	stationery	supplies	etc.	(UNCTAD)	
10	Electronics	 (excluding	parts	and	components),	parts	and	components	 for	electrical	and	electronic	goods;	 rubber	 tyres,	







1980	 1990	 2000	 2010	 2016	
Exports	of	goods	and	services	(as	a	share	of	total,	
%)	







1980	 1990	 2000	 2010	 2016	
Imports	of	goods	and	services	(as	shares	of	total,	
%)	










	 Low-income	 Lower-middle	income		 Upper-middle-income	 High-income	
Total	exports	
of	products	
(**)	Value	(**)	 %	(***)	 Value	(**)	 %	(***)	 Value	(**)	 %	(***)	 Value	(**)	 %	(***)	
Argentina	 207.6		 0.36	 					10,861		 18.81	 					23,601		 40.88	 							22,329		 38.68	 							57,733	
Australia	 460.2		 0.24	 					20,103		 10.60	 					69,769		 36.79	 							93,502		 49.31	 					189,629		
Brazil	 				765.1		 0.41	 					16,505		 8.91	 					76,270		 41.18	 							89,959		 48.57	 					185,235		
Canada	 							462		 0.12	 							8,512		 2.19	 					30,171		 7.75	 					349,880		 89.93	 					389,071		
China	 		26,952		 1.28	 			303,186		 14.45	 			292,325		 13.94	 		1,473,974		 70.27	 		2,097,637		
EU	 		19,066		 0.35	 			202,648		 3.77	 			699,589		 13.01	 		4,395,655		 81.77	 		5,375,326		
France	 				4,546		 0.93	 					28,045		 5.74	 					64,846		 13.26	 					390,509		 79.88	 					488,885		
Germany	 				2,008		 0.15	 					41,826		 3.12	 			223,663		 16.68	 		1,065,683		 79.48	 		1,340,752		
India	 		13,328		 5.12	 					34,195		 13.14	 					44,516		 17.10	 					168,284		 64.64	 					260,326		
Indonesia	 							959		 0.66	 					26,559		 18.38	 					35,984		 24.90	 							80,979		 56.05	 					144,489		
Italy	 				1,381		 0.30	 					22,419		 4.86	 					74,982		 16.25	 					358,281		 77.63	 					461,529		
Japan	 				2,104		 0.33	 					54,318		 8.42	 			191,203		 29.65	 					397,266		 61.60	 					644,932		
Korea	 				4,964		 1.00	 					70,753		 14.28	 			186,843		 37.71	 					232,818		 46.99	 					495,417		
Mexico	 			137.8		 0.04	 							7,647		 2.05	 					20,955		 5.60	 					345,057		 92.29	 					373,892		
Russia	 				809.6		 0.28	 					29,211		 10.23	 					86,429		 30.27	 					168,952		 59.18	 					285,491		
S.	Arabia	 				2,355		 1.13	 					39,154		 18.86	 					45,826		 22.08	 					120,234		 57.92	 					207,572		
S.	Africa	 				6,687		 9.02	 					11,453		 15.46	 					17,148		 23.14	 							34,253		 46.22	 							74,110		
Turkey	 				1,577		 1.11	 					15,209		 10.67	 					33,430		 23.45	 							89,556		 62.83	 					142,529		
UK	 				1,139		 0.28	 					15,708		 3.82	 					46,269		 11.25	 					342,971		 83.35	 					411,463		
US	 				4,798		 0.33	 					80,733		 5.57	 			491,201		 33.87	 					873,646		 60.23	 		1,450,457		
G20	Total	 		85,637		 0.69	 			931,055		 7.52	 2,345,265		 18.95	 		8,936,351		 72.22	 12,373,853		
World	 122,037		 0.76	 1,387,606		 8.66	 3,456,007		 21.56	 10,959,812		 68.39	 16,026,140		
Source:	UNCTAD,	(*)	According	to	the	World	Bank	classification,	(**)	In	millions	of	current	US	$,	(***)	The	share	
in	the	exports	of	products	of	the	economy	
Although	 their	 share	 has	 been	 declining	 since	 2000s,	 Northern	 America	 and	 Europe	 are	 still	 the	
favorite	destination	for	the	goods	exported	from	G20	economies	(Figure	14).	In	2016,	57.9%	of	total	


















Value	(*)	 %	(**)	 Value	(*)	 %	(**)	 Value	(*)	 %	(**)	
China	 55.73	 4.00	 513.73	 19.83	 652.79	 21.97	
EU	 193.82	 13.90	 387.97	 14.98	 476.35	 16.03	
Germany	 100.38	 7.20	 222.67	 8.59	 260.89	 8.78	
US	 236.66	 16.98	 193.46	 7.47	 208.25	 7.01	
Korea	 63.45	 4.55	 140.38	 5.42	 145.77	 4.91	
France	 71.20	 5.11	 130.81	 5.05	 133.48	 4.49	
Japan	 151.81	 10.89	 138.46	 5.34	 118.84	 4.00	
UK	 83.01	 5.95	 88.70	 3.42	 108.20	 3.64	
Mexico	 41.58	 2.98	 72.92	 2.81	 82.60	 2.78	
Italy	 27.37	 1.96	 45.31	 1.75	 48.76	 1.64	
Canada	 31.61	 2.27	 28.09	 1.08	 30.71	 1.03	
India	 1.99	 0.14	 15.24	 0.59	 24.84	 0.84	
Brazil	 6.83	 0.49	 9.40	 0.36	 10.52	 0.35	
Australia	 4.48	 0.32	 8.94	 0.34	 9.79	 0.33	
Indonesia	 8.25	 0.59	 8.85	 0.34	 7.35	 0.25	
Russia	 1.95	 0.14	 3.68	 0.14	 5.83	 0.20	
Turkey	 1.98	 0.14	 3.58	 0.14	 4.65	 0.16	
S.	Africa	 1.00	 0.07	 2.31	 0.09	 2.73	 0.09	
S.	Arabia	 0.02	 0.00	 0.23	 0.01	 1.75	 0.06	
Argentina	 0.78	 0.06	 1.69	 0.07	 1.58	 0.05	
G20	 801.94	 57.52	 1,528.91	 59.01	 1,784.35	 60.05	
World	Total	 1,394.16	 	 2,590.73	 	 2,971.57	 	
Source:	World	Integrated	Trade	Solution	(WITS)	(https://wits.worldbank.org/about_wits.html)	
(*)	Current	US$	billions	(**)	Share	in	world	total.	
In	high-technology	 industries12,	 the	 share	of	G20	economies	 in	 total	exports	of	 goods	 increased	 to	
60.05%	in	2016	from	57.52%	in	2000	(Table	4).	We	observe	a	remarkable	change	regarding	the	high-
technology	industries’	exports	of	G20	economies.	While	the	shares	of	US,	Japan,	UK,	and	some	other	



























Value	(*)	 Value	(*)	 %	(**)	 Value	(*)	 %	(**)	 Value	(*)	 %	(**)	
Argentina	 1,585	 574	 36.20	 2	 0.10	 981	 61.90	
Australia	 9,790	 7,218	 73.73	 81	 0.82	 2,364	 24.14	
Brazil	 10,524	 7,933	 75.39	 62	 0.59	 2,459	 23.36	
Canada	 30,711	 26,661	 86.81	 109	 0.36	 3,082	 10.04	
China	 652,788	 497,996	 76.29	 5,707	 0.87	 118,982	 18.23	
EU	 260,887	 185,900	 59.32	 467	 1.11	 50,651	 33.96	
France	 476,349	 282,555	 66.52	 5,289	 1.61	 161,777	 27.58	
Germany	 133,480	 88,796	 71.26	 2,154	 0.18	 36,812	 19.41	
India	 108,197	 87,016	 57.73	 451	 8.67	 14,458	 38.48	
Indonesia	 7,345	 5,490	 74.74	 93	 1.27	 1,576	 21.45	
Italy	 24,838	 14,339	 78.81	 2,152	 0.28	 9,556	 15.45	
Japan	 48,756	 38,426	 51.97	 136	 0.17	 7,531	 36.68	
Korea	 118,841	 61,766	 36.99	 201	 0.17	 43,587	 57.77	
Mexico	 145,774	 53,924	 93.35	 251	 0.03	 84,207	 6.14	
Russia	 82,603	 77,114	 18.71	 27	 3.54	 5,068	 79.73	
S.	Africa	 5,830	 1,091	 41.98	 207	 16.83	 4,648	 54.72	
S.	Arabia	 1,748	 1,379	 78.87	 10	 0.58	 285	 16.30	
Turkey	 4,651	 3,150	 67.72	 62	 1.34	 1,081	 23.25	
UK	 208,246	 128,365	 80.42	 602	 0.42	 67,042	 13.36	
US	 2,729	 1,146	 61.64	 459	 0.29	 1,493	 32.19	







technology	 transfer	 from	 abroad	 and	 countries	 get	 disembodied	 technology	 in	 this	 way.	 In	 this	
regard,	China,	EU,	and	India	appear	as	the	most	important	disembodied	technology	sources	for	LDCs	














	 Value	(*)	 Value	(*)	 %	(**)	 Value	(*)	 %	(**)	 Value	(*)	 %	(**)	
Argentina	 1,016	 213	 20.96	 794	 78.15	 4	 0.36	
Australia	 9,084	 5,765	 63.47	 3,032	 33.37	 157	 1.73	
Brazil	 14,987	 8,309	 55.44	 6,555	 43.74	 103	 0.69	
Canada	 32,383	 28,084	 86.73	 3,868	 11.94	 97	 0.30	
China	 835,639	 595,346	 71.24	 195,336	 23.38	 12,118	 1.45	
EU	 484,054	 225,343	 46.55	 234,453	 48.44	 7,520	 1.55	
France	 83,686	 56,021	 66.94	 21,239	 25.38	 1,242	 1.48	
Germany	 354,587	 211,702	 59.70	 95,031	 26.80	 1,428	 0.40	
India	 23,273	 12,261	 52.68	 9,815	 42.17	 2,320	 9.97	
Indonesia	 9,890	 6,805	 68.81	 2,741	 27.71	 91	 0.92	
Italy	 111,408	 65,736	 59.01	 34,637	 31.09	 1,147	 1.03	
Japan	 215,494	 103,685	 48.11	 94,002	 43.62	 821	 0.38	
Korea	 205,236	 73,699	 35.91	 121,055	 58.98	 561	 0.27	
Mexico	 105,586	 99,952	 94.66	 5,103	 4.83	 35	 0.03	
Russia	 9,521	 1,534	 16.11	 7,352	 77.22	 241	 2.53	
S.	Arabia	 2,451	 1,918	 78.26	 369	 15.08	 34	 1.37	
S.	Africa	 6,687	 2,447	 36.59	 4,006	 59.91	 1,671	 24.99	
Turkey	 12,241	 4,961	 40.53	 5,505	 44.98	 349	 2.85	
UK	 74,013	 54,340	 73.42	 14,111	 19.07	 689	 0.93	
US	 256,614	 133,805	 52.14	 108,370	 42.23	 1,517	 0.59	




which	 corresponds	 to	 77.6%	 of	 total	 exports	 of	 services	 around	 the	 world	 in	 2017.	 We	 see	 the	
control	of	G20	economies	 in	knowledge-intensive	 services,	 too.	G20	economies	exported	90.5%	of	
R&D	 services,	 84.8%	 of	 computer	 services	 (software	 and	 other	 related	 services),	 and	 93.8%	 of	
information	services	in	2017.	On	the	other	hand,	G20	economies	also	the	main	importer	of	services.	
They	 were	 the	 destination	 of	 76.7%	 of	 total	 imports	 of	 services	 around	 the	 world	 in	 2017.	 The	
charges	 for	 the	use	of	 intellectual	property13	 that	was	paid	 to	G20	economies	 increased	 from	US$	






(Figure	 15).	 G20	 economies	 are	 also	 the	most	 important	 source	 of	 the	 outward	 FDI,	 though	 their	
																																																						
13	Includes:	(a)	charges	for	the	use	of	proprietary	rights	(such	as	patents,	trademarks,	copyrights,	industrial	processes	and	
designs	 including	 trade	 secrets,	 franchises)	 and	 (b)	 charges	 for	 licenses	 to	 reproduce	 or	 distribute	 (or	 both)	 intellectual	
property	embodied	in	produced	originals	or	prototypes	(such	as	copyrights	on	books	and	manuscripts,	computer	software,	













in	 which	 knowledge	 is	 an	 important	 asset	 such	 as	 aircraft,	 communications	 equipment,	 motor	
vehicles,	 and	 pharmaceuticals.	 The	 value	 of	 foreign	 assets	 of	 those	 91	MNEs	was	 around	US$	 8.3	
trillion	and	they	employed	about	8.37	million	people	abroad	by	2017.	If	we	focus	on	developing	and	
transition	economies,	UNCTAD’s	data14	shows	that	71	of	top	100	non-financial	MNEs	were	from	G20	














1990	 2000	 2010	 2017	 1990	 2000	 2010	 2017	
Inward	FDI	Stock	 Outward	FDI	Stock	
Inward	and	Outward	FDI	Stocks	by	2017	(US$	in	trillions)	
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Foreign	 Total	 Foreign	 Total	 Foreign	 Total	
Australia	 1	 55,191	 116,985		 35,567		 37,565		 10,240		 26,146		
Belgium	 1	 165,176		 205,173		 38,429		 47,052		 156,544		 200,000		
Canada	 2	 107,374		 199,477		 26,869		 44,547		 8,419		 19,479		
China	**	 5	 362,383		 631,508	 107,105		 249,092		 603,598		 970,496		
Finland	 1	 42,816		 49,201		 24,182		 26,096		 95,372		 101,731		
France	 12	 899,070		 1,550,236		 499,835		 694,513		 979,197		 1,565,754		
Germany	 11	 1,073,679		 1,855,384		 799,779		 1,045,373		 1,560,290		 2,694,709		
Ireland	 4	 296,743		 337,824		 67,994		 90,263		 192,223		 252,844		
Israel	 1	 50,641		 70,739		 17,445		 21,629		 45,546		 51,791		
Italy	 2	 238,756		 324,501		 82,215		 157,365		 44,412		 96,436		
Japan	 11	 1,215,285		 1,995,636		 657,524		 1,085,937		 907,549		 1,737,354		
Korea	 1	 83,371		 282,814		 183,963		 211,859		 215,541		 308,745		
Luxembourg	 1	 68,678		 71,104		 57,159		 57,252		 118,465		 197,108		
Netherlands	 1	 83,710		 86,876		 24,273		 26,494		 45,454		 47,173		
Norway	 1	 59,732		 111,100		 13,414		 60,971		 2,613		 20,245		
Singapore	 1	 52,764		 54,418		 17,313		 17,636		 13,100		 14,000		
Spain	 3	 262,502		 342,542		 113,864		 140,856		 127,259		 181,199		
Sweden	 1	 43,756		 50,255		 38,123		 39,179		 67,139		 87,104		
Switzerland	 5	 407,462		 546,280		 337,837		 416,365		 600,662		 766,268		
Taiwan	 1	 95,809		 114,824		 151,752		 154,650		 728,431		 873,000		
United	
Kingdom	 14	 1,501,807		 1,747,604		 769,467		 1,000,805		 925,963		 1,212,660		
United	
States	 20	 1,841,202		 3,750,152		 1,107,012		 2,339,216		 2,315,926		 5,224,710		
Source:	UNCTAD’s	World	Investment	Report	2018	15	
*	Shaded	are	G20	economies	(including	EU	countries),	**Includes	Hong	Kong	
Data	 related	 to	 the	 cross-border	mergers	 and	 acquisitions	 (M&As	 or	 brownfield	 investments)	 and	
greenfield	investments	confirm	the	control	of	G20	economies	on	FDI.	According	to	UNCTAD’s	World	
Investment	Report	2018,	G20	economies	appear	both	as	the	top	sellers	and	purchasers	 in	terms	of	
the	net	cross-border	M&As.	As	shown	by	Figure	16,	 there	were	sharp	 fluctuations	 in	 the	shares	of	
G20	economies	in	the	total	cross-border	M&As	during	the	global	crises	(2001	and	2008)	in	parallel	to	
the	 global	 trend.	 Yet,	 the	 shares	 of	 G20	 economies	 in	 the	 total	 cross-border	M&As	 has	 remained	
stable	 over	 time.	 We	 could	 observe	 similar	 trends	 and	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 values	 of	 M&As	
materialized	 between	 1990	 and	 2017.	 That	 figures	 provide	 reasonable	 grounds	 to	 suppose	 that	 a	
large	 part	 of	 the	 global	 M&As	 occurred	 among	 G20	 economies.	 Yet,	 the	 disparities	 among	 G20	
economies	regarding	M&As	should	be	underlined.	UNCTAD’s	data	shows	that	71.32%	of	total	M&A	
sales	 and	 58.28%	 of	 total	M&A	 purchases	were	made	 by	 EU	 countries	 (particularly	 by	 the	United	














According	 to	World	 Investment	 Report	 2018	 of	 UNCTAD,	 G20	 economies	were	 announced	 as	 the	
destination	for	76.07%	of	the	greenfield	FDI	projects	around	the	world	between	2003	and	2017.	The	
value	of	these	projects	constituted	67.79%	of	the	total	greenfield	FDI	projects	announced	around	the	
world	 in	 the	 same	 period.	 EU	 countries	 attracted	 34.21%	 of	 the	 total	 announced	 greenfield	 FDI	





































































































































The	number	of	greenfield	FDI	projects	destined	 to	G20	economies	was	 significantly	more	 than	 the	
number	 of	M&As	 sold	 by	 G20	 economies	 between	 2003	 and	 2017	 (Figure	 18).	 Though,	 the	 total	
values	 of	 greenfield	 FDI	 projects	 destined	 to	 G20	 economies	 remained	 at	 low	 levels	 compare	 to	
M&As	 sold	 by	 those	 economies.	 Furthermore,	 the	 global	 brownfield	 FDI	 projects	 were	 more	
concentrated	on	 some	economies	 than	 the	brownfield	 FDI	projects	 in	 terms	of	both	numbers	 and	
values.	Between	2003	and	2017,	the	total	values	of	M&As	sold	by	North	American	(the	United	States	
and	Canada)	and	European	Union	countries	constituted	74.53%	of	the	world	total	whereas	the	total	

















































related.	The	 investments	on	sales,	marketing,	and	support	activities	 constituted	 the	 largest	part	of	
the	rest.	Together	with	the	 investments	on	headquarters,	R&D,	and	design	and	test	activities	were	
just	 8-9%	 of	 the	 total	 cross-border	 investments	 in	 the	 same	 period	 (Figure	 19).	 The	 share	 of	
production	 in	 total	 cross-border	 investments	 varied	 across	 countries.	While	 their	 share	was	 about	
50-55%	in	relatively	more	developed	countries	such	as	the	United	States,	Germany,	and	Japan,	that	
figure	was	at	higher	 levels	 in	emerging	economies	(70%	in	China	and	Brazil,	84%	in	 Indonesia	e.g.).	
The	FDI	in	R&D	was	more	concentrated	on	OECD	countries,	particularly	the	United	States	and	Europe	
(Belderbos	et	al.,	2016).	Castellani	(2017)	indicates	that	only	1,600	cities	received	at	least	one	FDI	in	


































2014.	 Furthermore,	 60%	 of	 the	 R&D	 FDI	 projects	 destined	 to	 only	 100	 cities.	 Castellani	 and	
Lavoratori's	(2017)	study	of	2,580	new	greenfield	investments	in	R&D	and	design,	development	and	
testing	(DDT)	made	by	1,316	MNEs	between	2003	and	2014	show	that	these	projects	were	located	in	
110	 cities	 around	 the	world.	According	 to	 the	 study,	 21	 cities	 in	 East	Asia	 and	Pacific	 (EAP)	 region	






easily	 speculated	 that	 a	 large	 part	 of	 FDI	 in	 R&D	 of	 G20	 economies	 are	 intra-group	 transactions	




















Although	 their	 share	 in	 the	 global	 gross	 expenditure	 on	 R&D	 (GERD)	 declined	 between	 2010	 and	
2015,	due	to	the	deceleration	of	R&D	spending	in	developed	countries,	G20	economies	still	dominate	
the	global	R&D	(Figure	22).	In	2015,	these	economies	spent	82.11%	of	the	global	GERD.	Within	G20,	
the	 United	 States,	 European	 Union	 countries	 (particularly	 Germany,	 France,	 and	 the	 United	















































































members	 of	 G20	 (Figure	 24).	While,	 the	 R&D	 activities	 of	 governments	 are	 at	 significantly	 higher	
levels	 in	 Argentina,	 India,	 Indonesia,	 Mexico,	 and	 Russia.	 In	 Australia,	 Canada,	 Indonesia,	 South	
Africa,	 and	 Turkey,	 universities	 performed	 more	 than	 30%	 of	 R&D	 activities	 in	 2015.	 Business	
enterprises	appear	as	the	main	funder	of	R&D	activities	in	most	of	G20	economies.	Yet,	government	
is	still	an	important	resource	for	R&D	in	many	countries.	The	relatively	large	share	of	R&D	activities	


















1996	 2000	 2005	 2010	 2015	
Shares	of	economies	in	GERD	within	G20	(%)	







of	 researchers	 (headcount)	 in	 R&D	per	million	 inhabitants	 vary	 across	G20	 economies	 (Figure	 25).	
That	figure	surpassed	3,000	in	10	(including	EU)	members	of	G20	between	2010	and	2015	whereas	


































































































































































































G20’s	 share	 in	 the	 total	 scientific	 and	 technical	 articles	 somewhat	 remained	 at	 the	 same	 levels	
between	2003-2016,	the	shares	of	other	major	economic	clubs,	except	BRICS,	remarkably	declined.	
Within	G20,	EU	countries	lead	the	way	in	scientific	and	technical	publications.	China,	by	dramatically	
increasing	 the	number	of	 its	 scientific	 and	 technical	 articles	 from	86,621.4	 in	2003	 to	426,165.3	 in	
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and	 Japan	were	 the	most	patent	granted	economies	within	G20.	 If	we	examine	patent	 statistics	 in	
detail,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 residents	 of	 G20	 economies	 largely	 dominate	 all	 technological	 fields	 in	
terms	of	granted	patents.	In	computer	technology,	for	example,	at	least20	98.1%	of	granted	patents	
were	 filed	 by	 the	 residents	 of	 G20	 in	 2016.	 That	 figure	 was	 90%	 in	 biotechnology,	 88.5%	 in	
pharmaceuticals,	 and	 94.8%	 in	 micro-structural	 and	 nanotechnology.	 The	 indicators	 related	 to	
scientific	 and	 technical	 articles,	 and	 patents	 clearly	 show	 that	 the	 global	 knowledge	 generation	 is	
largely	driven	by	G20	economies.		
OECD’s	calculations21	show	that	 international	collaboration22	on	scientific	studies	 improved	 in	most	
of	G20	economies	between	2005	and	2015,	 in	parallel	to	the	global	trend.23	As	shown	in	Figure	28,	




22	 “International	 collaboration	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 number	 of	 domestically	 authored	 publications	 incorporating	
































OECD’s	calculations	about	 the	openness	 level	of	 scientific	publications	show	that	 there	 is	 room	for	





































































































































































OECD’s	Science,	Technology	and	 Industry	Scoreboard	2017	reports	 that	 the	share	of	 internet	users	
continued	 to	 increase	 (Figure	 30).	 That	 was	 valid	 for	 the	 mobile	 broadband	 subscriptions	 that	
enhance	 the	 access	 to	 the	 services	 that	 allow	 individuals	 to	 improve	 themselves	 via	 participating	










which	makes	machine-to-machine	 (M2M)	 communication	 possible	 and	 constitute	 one	 part	 of	 the	







































G20	 economies	 are	 the	 main	 players	 in	 artificial	 intelligence	 (Figure	 32).	 According	 to	 OECD	 STI	
Scoreboard	2017,	nine	of	 the	 top	 ten	economies	 in	 terms	of	AI-related	patents	between	2010	and	
2015	 were	 G20	 members.	 Japan,	 the	 United	 States,	 and	 Korea	 produced	 almost	 two-third	 of	 AI-
related	patents	in	that	period.	The	increase	in	the	share	of	China	in	AI-related	patents	might	be	seen	
as	 the	 reason	 of	 the	 remarkable	 declines	 in	 the	 shares	 of	 developed	 countries.	 In	 contrast	 to	
mentioned	 countries,	 the	 shares	 of	 Turkey,	 Brazil,	 Russia,	 Italy,	 and	Australia	 in	AI-related	patents	




































G20	 economies	 (the	 United	 Kingdom,	 China,	 Mexico,	 South	 Africa,	 Turkey,	 Argentina,	 Brazil,	










economies	 regarding	 automation	 and	 robotics	 and	may	 provide	 insights	 about	 the	 future	 agenda	
(Table	8).	The	Index	“assesses	how	well-prepared	25	countries	(of	which	20	are	in	G20,	including	EU	
countries)	 are	 for	 the	 challenges	 and	 opportunities	 of	 intelligent	 automation”.26	 It	 reveals	 the	
disparities	 among	 economies	 regarding	 automation	 as	well.	 The	 Index	 is	 composed	 of	 three	main	
components	that	are	 innovation	environment,	education	policies,	and	 labor	market	policies.	Korea,	










	 Overall	Score	 Innovation	Environment	 Education	Policies	 Labor	Market	Policies	
	 Average	 62.13	
	 Average	 69.85	 	 Average	 55.28	 	 Average	 60.38	
1	 Korea	 91.3	 1	 Japan	 94.61	 1	 Korea	 87.5	 =1	 Germany	 93.75	
2	 Germany	 89.6	 2	 Korea	 93.87	 2	 Estonia	 86.11	 =1	 Singapore	 93.75	
3	 Singapore	 87.25	 3	 Germany	 93.78	 3	 Singapore	 84.72	 =1	 Korea	 93.75	
4	 Japan	 82.57	 4	 France	 91.26	 4	 Germany	 83.33	 4	 Japan	 87.5	
5	 Canada	 81.76	 5	 Singapore	 86.52	 5	 Canada	 79.17	 5	 Canada	 84.38	
6	 Estonia	 79.46	 6	 UK	 84.24	 6	 France	 76.39	 6	 UK	 71.88	
7	 France	 78.93	 7	 Australia	 83.41	 7	 Japan	 68.06	 =7	 China	 68.75	
8	 UK	 73.07	 8	 Canada	 83.04	 8	 UAE	 63.89	 =7	 Estonia	 68.75	
9	 US	 71.96	 9	 US	 83.02	 =9	 UK	 62.5	 =7	 US	 68.75	
10	 Australia	 70.38	 10	 China	 80.66	 =9	 US	 62.5	 =10	 Australia	 65.63	
11	 Italy	 67.54	 11	 Italy	 79.09	 11	 Australia	 59.72	 =10	 Italy	 65.63	
12	 China	 67.12	 12	 Estonia	 78.16	 12	 Argentina	 58.33	 12	 France	 59.38	
13	 UAE	 64.29	 13	 Russia	 73.25	 13	 Italy	 56.94	 =13	 Brazil	 56.25	
14	 Malaysia	 57.66	 14	 UAE	 68.7	 =14	 China	 52.78	 =13	 Turkey	 56.25	
15	 Turkey	 53.71	 15	 Turkey	 67.26	 =14	 Malaysia	 52.78	 =13	 UAE	 56.25	
16	 Russia	 52.49	 16	 Malaysia	 66.36	 16	 Colombia	 50	 =16	 India	 53.13	
17	 Argentina	 51.74	 17	 India	 62.27	 17	 Brazil	 47.22	 =16	 Saudi	Arabia	 53.13	
18	 India	 47.2	 18	 South	Africa	 57.8	 18	 Turkey	 38.89	 18	 Malaysia	 50	
19	 Brazil	 46.4	 19	 Argentina	 55.4	 19	 Mexico	 37.5	 19	 Russia	 43.75	
20	 Colombia	 44.65	 20	 Saudi	Arabia	 47.8	 20	 Russia	 36.11	 =20	 Colombia	 40.63	
21	 Saudi	Arabia	 41.97	 21	 Vietnam	 46.6	 21	 Saudi	Arabia	 30.56	 =20	 Vietnam	 40.63	
22	 South	Africa	 41.04	 22	 Mexico	 45.52	 =22	 India	 29.17	 =22	 Indonesia	 37.5	
23	 Mexico	 40.71	 23	 Indonesia	 41.7	 =22	 South	Africa	 29.17	 =22	 Mexico	 37.5	
24	 Vietnam	 37.32	 24	 Colombia	 41.3	 24	 Vietnam	 26.39	 =24	 Argentina	 31.25	
25	 Indonesia	 33.07	 25	 Brazil	 40.64	 25	 Indonesia	 22.22	 =24	 South	Africa	 31.25	
Source:	http://www.automationreadiness.eiu.com/		
Blue:	Mature,	Green:	Developed,	Yellow:	Emerging,	Orange:	Nascent	
In	 this	 section,	we	 concisely	 summarize	 socio-economic	 conditions	 in	 G20	 economies	 and	 present	
their	 scientific	 and	 technological	 competence.	 G20	 appears	 as	 the	 largest	 and	 most	 influential	
economic	club	of	the	globe.	Furthermore,	its	impact	on	the	world	economy	continues	to	increase	in	
comparison	 to	 other	 economic	 clubs	 that	 consist	 of	 relatively	 more	 developed	 countries	 such	 as	
OECD,	 G7,	 and	 EU.	 Yet,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 consider	 G20	 as	 a	 monolithic	 actor.	 There	 are	 significant	
disparities	 among	 its	 members	 regarding	 socio-economic	 development	 and	 scientific	 capability.	
There	have	been		notable	changes	within	G20	as	well.	China’s	progress	in	every	aspect	of	economic	
and	technological	development	has	increased	its	influence	not	just	within	G20	but	also	in	the	world.	
International	 trade	 and	 cross-border	 investments	 around	 the	 world	 are	 mainly	 driven	 by	 G20	
economies.	Those	could	be	considered	as	important	mechanisms	for	the	transfer	of	knowledge	from	
relatively	more	developed	economies	to	less	developed	regions	of	the	world.	However,	data	shows	







only	 for	 individual	 countries	 but	 also	 for	 country	 clubs.	 Ezell	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 find	 that	 some	 national	
innovation	 policies	 (Finland,	 Sweden,	 UK)	 add	 value	 to	 the	 global	 innovation	 system	 while	 some	
others	 (India,	 China,	 Thailand)	 may	 have	 harmful	 impact	 on	 it.27	 	 Moreover,	 there	 is	 a	 close	
correlation	between	 the	 success	of	 national	 policies	 and	 contribution	 to	 global	 innovation	 system.	
According	to	Table	9	the	highest	ranks	in	terms	of	net	score	among	the	G20	countries	belong	to	UK	
(3rd),	US	(10th)	and	France	(11th)	while	the	lowest	ranks	stand	for	Argentina	(56th),	Indonesia	(55th)	and	









27	 Contributions	 are	 mainly	 measured	 through	 taxes,	 human	 capital	 and	 R&D	 and	 technology	 while	 the	









policies	 as	 evident	 from	 Figure	 34.	 Except	 Korea,	 Canada	 and	 China,	 two	 groupings	 are	 observed.	
Some	members	 are	 placed	 in	 “above	 average	 beneficial	 policies,	 below	 average	 harmful	 policies”	
quadrant	 such	 as	 UK,	 Germany,	 France,	 USA,	 Australia	 while	 the	 others	 (Russia,	 Brazil,	 Turkey,	
Mexico,	 India	 and	 Argentina)	 are	 on	 “below	 average	 beneficial	 policies,	 above	 average	 harmful	
policies”	quadrant.	It	seems	that	most	of	the	EU	member	states	is	on	the	first	quadrant	which	gives	
an	 evidence	 in	 favor	 EU	 innovation	 policies	 that	 especially	 accelerated	 through	 framework	
	 37	







et	 al.	 (2016:12)	 resemble	 the	 situation	 a	 prisoner’	 dilemma	 yet	 conclude	 that	 “if	 humanity	 is	 to	
maximize	 the	 global	 innovation	 needed	 to	 tackle	 an	 array	 of	 pressing	 challenges,	 including	
developing	low-cost	clean	energy	technologies,	making	breakthroughs	in	drugs	and	medical	devices,	
dealing	with	climate	change	and	resource	scarcity,	and	developing	new	technologies	that	can	boost	
productivity,	 the	world	will	need	a	 fundamentally	new	approach	 to	 supporting	development	of	and	













The	figures	 in	previous	section,	 in	fact,	call	 for	a	collective	action	for	G20.	 In	some	members,	there	
are	still	problems	concerning	schooling	and	STEM	education.	Second,	there	 is	a	need	for	upgrading	
labor	 force	 skills	 especially	 for	 the	 digital	 transformation.	 Third,	 knowledge-intensive	 sectors	 are	
growing	on	a	global	scene	in	G20	which	is	an	opportunity	for	knowledge	transfer	both	inside	G20	and	
other	economies.	Fourth,	new	markets	seem	to	be	emerging	for	G20	trade,	thus	transfer	of	skills	to	
low-income	 countries	 and	 FDI	 especially	 in	 the	 form	 of	 green	 investments	 will	 create	 long-term	
opportunities	through	upgrading	both	in	the	supply	chain	and	the	quality	of	demand.	Finally,	there	is	
an	 urgent	 intervention	 for	 a	 consensus	 on	 trade	 policies	 and	 keeping	 global	 markets	 away	 from	
innovation	mercantilism.			
These	measures	calls	for	a	systemic	action	towards	a	GIS	in	the	context	of	seven	pillars	listed	above	
since	most	of	 the	 global	 challenges	 cannot	be	mitigated	by	either	 regional	 and/or	national	 action.	
The	 governance	 structure	 can	 be	 transferred	 from	 successful	 applications	 of	 EU	 towards	 more	

















growth	 involves	 the	broadening	of	 the	global	 frontier	 through	a	global	 club	governance.	However,	













global	 governance	 structure	 would	 construct	 a	 more	 level	 playing	 field	 for	 all	 involved	 actors	






these	working	groups	are	 loosely	defined	and	G20	needs	a	 systemic	approach	 towards	GIS	and,	 in	
turn,	for	a	wealthier	globe.	The	major	problem	in	this	process	is	the	existence	of	complex	spaces	in	
which	global	 innovation	networks	 and	national	 systems	are	 complicated	 to	 govern.	However,	with	
small	 starting	steps	and	well-defined	global	challenges,	 the	paper	shows	that	club	governance	of	a	
GIS	 is	 possible	 through	 the	 transformation	 of	 existing	 global	 socio-technical	 system.	 From	 an	
evolutionary	 perspective,	 in	 order	 to	 mitigate	 the	 existing	 global	 challenges,	 this	 transformation	
seems	to	be	inevitable	for	the	prosperous	future	of	humanity.	The	design	of	GIS	necessitates	various	
starting	 postulates.	 First,	 various	 studies	 (Castellani	 and	 Zanfei,	 2006;	Dicken,	 2007;	 Redlich	 et	 al.,	




innovation	 system	 brings	 about	 higher	 success	 with	 an	 ever	 increasing	 update	 of	 the	 knowledge	
base.	 Second,	 the	 functional	 dynamics	 of	 GIS	 should	 be	 built	 upon	 a	 participatory	 bottom-up	
decision-making	 process.	 Actors,	 networks	 and	 institutions	 should	 be	 tied	 up	 to	 functions	 as	
proposed	by	Oltander	and	Prez	Vico,	2005;	Hekkert	et	al.,		2007;	Bergek	et	al.,	2008;	and	Hekkert	et	






actors	 of	 the	 system	 should	 agree	on	 the	 global	 problems	where	 the	minimal	 number	of	 disputes	
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